Our perceptual experience is influenced both by incoming sensory information and prior knowledge about the world: a concept recently formalized within Bayesian decision theory. We
We start with the suggestion that it is not sensory processing itself that is different in autism, but the interpretation of sensory input to yield percepts. We further propose that Bayesian decision theory, a principled description of the processes that enable observers to derive the most probable interpretations of their environment (see Box 1) , provides a powerful tool to study the mechanisms underlying the diverse range of non-social features in autism.
Such computational methods should formalise the process of generating experimentally testable hypotheses about the underlying functional atypicalities in autistic perception. Specifically we suggest that atypicalities exist at the level of our internal, working models of the world -priors in Bayesian terms -and that these lead to characteristic differences in autistic sensation and perception.
Perceptual processing in autism
It has long been known that perceptual processing is unusual in autism. Early studies reported autistic exceptional performance on the Embedded Figures Test, finding hidden figures (e.g., triangle) within larger meaningful drawings (e.g., pram) [11] . Other studies have shown less susceptibility to visual illusions [12] , the prevalence of absolute pitch [13] , enhanced performance on visual search tasks [14, 15] and superior visual discrimination [5, 16] . These initial studies spawned a raft of further investigations [see 17], generally revealing atypicalities in the perception of characteristically non-social stimuli, such as chromatic stimuli [18] , isolated tones [19] , coherently moving dots [20] and complex objects [21] , as well as social stimuli, including faces [21, 22] , eye-gaze direction [23, 24] , biological motion [25, 26] , and speech [27] .
There have been several influential accounts of the non-social symptoms and perceptual processing differences in autism, which each differ with regard to the precise nature of the atypicality. Frith and Happé's weak central coherence hypothesis (1989; Happé & Frith, 2006) was the first to suggest that the non-social symptoms in autism -the weaknesses and the strengths -could be explained by a domain-general processing style that afforded "privileged access to parts and details" (Frith & Happé, 1994, p. 122 ) and resulted in difficulties processing information in context. Later, they suggested that problems in top-down modulation could lead to hypersensitivity to sensory stimuli in autism ("naming the pitch of the 'pop' of a cork") and that a detail-focused processing style caused the characteristic "insistence on sameness" (Happé & Frith, 2006).
Others have posited alternative accounts, which move beyond the focus on local-global processing in autism, and place autistic differences squarely in the realm of perception.
Plaisted [9] proposed that autistic individuals' perceptual atypicalities were due to account that autistic perception is characterized by enhancements in bottom-up, feedforward perceptual operations. These authors [28] further suggest that autistic perception is autonomous from higher-level, top-down influences and may involve a one-to-one or veridical mapping process. On this account, hypersensitivity in autism results from an imbalance in inhibitory and excitatory connectivity between local neural networks in sensory regions [see also 5, 9, 10, 29, 30] .
Despite their prominence in the autism field, the impact of these accounts has been limited both by the lack of data demonstrating an empirical link between theoretical constructs -such as "top-down control" -and autistic sensory and other non-social atypicalities and, in some cases, by their overly descriptive nature, failing to fully specify the underlying (altered) mechanisms, that is, the nature of the computations.
Moreover, these accounts focus predominantly on enhancements in sensation and perception (hypersensitivity) in autism. Yet the nature and degree of sensory atypicalities in autism -hypersensitivity, hyposensitivity and sensory seeking behaviours -vary enormously and reportedly fluctuate even within the same individuals. These sensory but also the other nonsocial features of autism present a serious challenge for current explanations of autism.
Furthermore, such theories also have difficulty accounting for an apparent paradox, first noted by Kanner [31] in which "the child himself can happily make as great a noise as any that he dreads and move objects about to his heart's content" (p. 245), despite being distressed by incoming noises or movements. What is particularly unsettling for autistic individuals is therefore the unexpected and unpredictable nature of external events. We suggest that understanding how perceptual systems deal with uncertainty is key to explaining atypicalities in autistic sensation and perception.
Perception as inference
Recognizing that retinal images are inherently ambiguous, Helmholtz [32] suggested that perception is a process of unconscious inference: automatic and unconscious "best guesses" about the structure of the world, consistent with both the retinal images and past experience. Gregory [33] Bayesian statistical decision theory, a principled method of optimal reasoning under uncertainty, formalizes Helmoltz's and Gregory's notions of perception as unconscious inference [34] [35] [36] [37] . Box 1 lays out the basic principles of Bayesian inverse inference, illustrated by the specific example of Figure 2 . The simple image of the figure is consistent with many different physical shapes, depending on viewpoint, described by the likelihood function; but some are more prevalent in normal viewing than others, leading to a probability distribution referred to as the prior. The prior is combined with the likelihood to yield the posterior probability distribution, narrower than either the prior or the likelihood, whose maximum is taken as the statistically best estimate of the shape creating that image. If the prior is appropriate, the Bayesian framework provides the most efficient method to infer the 3D shape corresponding to the simple 2D line drawing.
In the real world, many other forms of knowledge are available as priors to aid disambiguation, such as the fact that light more probably comes from above, so shading can provide useful information [38] . Priors can explain many visual illusions. For example, the Kanizsa triangle (see Figure 1 ) is equally consistent with a continuous white triangle superimposed over three regular black circles, or three unlikely "pac-men" arranged symmetrically to face each other: the natural statistics of the world makes the single triangle more probable. Similarly, an a priori preference for slow speeds can aid disambiguation of motion direction, but is also consistent with many illusory perceptions of incorrect velocity [39] . Consistent with Gregory's view, these authors regard illusions not as perceptual errors or "sloppy computations", but are a consequence of statistically optimal computations that are functionally beneficial in the real world [39] .
In general, priors improve the efficiency of computations by reducing overall noise or error. Even when images are not ambiguous, this can be advantageous. For example, psychophysical judgments of almost all quantities -length, duration, number, color, weight, force -show the tendency to gravitate towards mean magnitude [40] . This fact has been well known for at least 100 years, but still not well understood. Recently Jazayeri and Shadlen [41] suggested that central tendency may represent another statistically optimal strategy, incorporating prior knowledge of the statistics of the environment in psychophysical judgments.
They suggest that the mean duration (or length, color, or weight) of the recent history acts as a prior, biasing judgments towards the mean. Although judgments are biased ("inaccurate"), reliability is improved and overall error-rate is reduced. Interestingly, this theoretical approach (supported by clear data [41, 42] ) suggests that priors do not need to be learned over a lifetime, but can be modulated over a relatively short timescale, in the order of minutes.
The above examples are intentionally simple, with only a few relevant variables such as curvature and slant, but the principles readily extend to high-dimensional space. Furthermore, advances in computational neuroscience are beginning to demonstrate how such probabilistic inference is instantiated in the brain. Some have shown that populations of neurons can code entire probability distributions relating to a stimulus and also the degree of uncertainty for computations like cue combination [43] . Others have suggested that probabilistic perception and learning should be better implemented with sampling-based approaches, whereby single neurons map on to inferred variables and uncertainty is represented by the variability of neural activity patterns [44] . Intriguingly, these authors have proposed that a priori beliefs about the world (priors) reside in spontaneous cortical activity (activity in the absence of sensory stimulation) -activity which is thought to be atypical in autism [45] .
Autistic perception within a Bayesian framework
We suggest that the Bayesian framework could be particularly useful for deriving testable hypotheses about functional atypicalities in autistic perception. Specifically, we propose that altered autistic perception results from atypicalities at the level of the prior -either in its construction or in combining appropriately with sensory information -yielding unusually attenuated priors or hypo-priors (see Figure 2 ). The suggestion here is not that individuals with autism have no priors, rather that their priors are broader. If true, we would expect that fewer internal constraints on perception -hypo-priors -should have substantial effects on autistic individuals' perceptual experiences.
One prediction is that hypo-priors should result in more "accurate" perception. As mentioned above, Bayesian priors sacrifice accuracy (understood as average closeness to physical reality) for improved precision (reliability), resulting in an overall reduction of error.
Under many conditions, strong (narrow) priors can bias perception towards the prior, away from the maximum likelihood, which is based only on sensory information. Hypo-priors in autism should distort sensory signals less, consistent with the often-reported superior performance of autistic individuals [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] . They are, for example, less susceptible to illusions such as the Kanizsa, Titchener, Poggendorf and Shepard "table-illusion" [7, 12] (see Figure 1) . Individuals with autism are also better at copying impossible figures [51] and are more accurate when asked to reproduce a slanted circle (ellipse) in the absence of perspective cues [52] . In all these somewhat artificial tasks, priors should actually impede performance.
A second prediction is that hypo-priors should impede performance in situations where priors help resolve ambiguity. For example, cast-shadows provided useful information about shape, if interpreted appropriately [38] , and indeed make objects more recognizable for typical individuals. For autistic children, however, cast shadows hinder recognition [53] -a finding that is consistent with the suggestion that autistic children make less use of prior information to interpret shadows appropriately. In this case, cast shadows just add to the perceptual noisiness of an image [38] .
A third, and less obvious, prediction is that hypo-priors in autism could cause the oftenreported sense of being overwhelmed by sensory information. Mukchopadhyay describes the experience of seeing everything afresh, rather than mediated by prior knowledge and expectation: "I began to fear all those unknown paths, clothes, shoes, chairs and strange human voices. Each one challenged me by putting me in front of a new situation for me to face and understand..." [3] . There are two ways that hypo-priors may lead to this form of phenomenon.
Priors -such as the example of central tendency -smooth variations in sensory input, often caused by measurement error rather than real variability: hypo-priors would result in more unexpected variability, even in constant stimuli. Alternatively, they could affect the learning process itself. Recent accounts show how knowledge of underlying image statistics is fundamental for learning [44] -as it is for perception. Attenuated priors could result in reduced capacity for generalization during learning, akin to what is known as "overfitting" in computer vision, fitting a model to noisy data rather than to the general trend. In both cases, hypo-priors would result in a mismatch between expectations and measurement, which could lead to phenomenological reports like Mukchopadhyay's.
A Bayesian framework might also help us to interpret findings of reduced adaptation in autism. Adaptation -ubiquitous in perceptual systems -is a rapid form of experiencedependent plasticity where sensory experience affects the response properties of neurons and, ultimately, perception [54] . It is generally accepted that adaptation serves to auto-calibrate perceptual systems to their environment [55, 56] . The effects of adaptation in autism have been investigated with the face aftereffect, where prolonged exposure to a specific facial identity biases subsequent perception away from that identity [57] . Children with autism showed significantly less adaptation than typical children. Critically, their perception was more accurate, in that the target face corresponded better to physical reality than to expectations. Subsequent studies have demonstrated diminished adaptation in autism for other sensory modalities, including touch [58] , and for relatives of autistic children [59] .
Adaptation does not always cause negative effects. In a recent study, Chopin and Mamassian [60] have shown that the effects of adaptation depend on when in the past the adapting stimuli occur. Recent adaptors affect the current percept negatively, biasing -for example -the perceived tilt in the direction opposite to the adaptors; adapting stimuli further in the past act in the opposite way, biasing tilt in the same direction as the adaptors. These results have very important implication for Bayesian explanations of adaptation {Stocker, 2006 #55; Clifford, 2012 #213}. Self-calibration theories of adaptation assume that the brain has some internal model of the expected distribution of response states. Within the Bayesian framework, the positive effects of adaptation of remote stimuli [60] suggest that the brain continually learns and updates the probability distributions of the world, over a moderately short timescale (5-10 minutes): the learnt distributions serve as priors, or standards for selfcalibration. The negative effects of recent stimuli could represent a recalibration of sensory resources under the assumption that the recent history of sensory input should conform to the established priors. Clearly, any atypicality at the level of the prior -either in its construction or use as a calibration standard -should clearly impact on the magnitude of adaptation. That is, hypo-priors in autistic perception may lead to difficulties in using information from the remote past to drive expectations about incoming sensory signals.
Hypo-priors may explain many of the non-social symptoms of autism
Hypo-priors in autism should cause a greater reliance on bottom-up, incoming sensory signals, which could in turn result in enhancement of sensory stimuli more broadly. Enhanced sensations, or "super qualia" [62] are consistent with the often-reported hypersensitivity to sensory information [4, 63] . Attenuated prior knowledge could also explain the co-occurrence of hyposensitivity and hypersensitivity within the same individuals. Without a template against which to match observed sensory evidence, the individual is less able to anticipate the forthcoming sensory environment in order to resolve perceptual ambiguity. Fewer internal constraints could also lead to a sense of alarm and the often-reported experience of sensory overload. Sensory symptoms in autism would therefore not be due to fundamental differences in sensory processing per se but rather reflect atypicalities in the way that incoming information is interpreted by sensory systems.
Furthermore, since it is assumed by Bayesian theory (see Box 1) that priors are altered according to the specific stimuli the individual encounters, the idiosyncratic pattern of sensory seeking (e.g., attraction to spinning objects) and hyper-sensitivity to stimuli (e.g., aversion to vacuum cleaners) is likely to be determined by the amount of and intensity of exposure to particular stimuli in the individual's environment.
Hypo-priors might also explain why autistic behaviours can be stereotyped and resistant to change. Prior knowledge should aid in the interpretation of predictable sensory events.
Sensory experiences that are less constrained by prior knowledge should therefore make it difficult to use knowledge derived from the past to generate predictions about the occurrence of new sensory events. This may shed light on the intense desire for sameness in autism, which may be not a problem with change per se, but in predicting the change. Becoming comfortable with new situations might also require many more exposures to a stimulus or context to overcome the potentially disadvantageous effects of less specific priors.
Well-known repetitive or "stimming" behaviours such as rocking, finger flicking, hand flapping, might also be accounted for by hypo-priors. Less specific priors could result in reduced generalization, which in turn could constrain motor plans to those that are already known.
Without the moderating effect of priors, self-generated repetitive behaviours -those over which the individual has full control -might be a means of reducing the uncertainty in the environment.
Conclusion
In this article we have proposed that the formal, computational principles of a Bayesian framework offer a way forward in identifying the causal mechanisms of altered autistic perception. We have suggested here that autistic people tend to perceive the world more accurately as a consequence of hypo-priors or less bias by prior experience -a notion that fits well with extant empirical data. Certain aspects of our account have been raised previously [6, 7] . The distinct advantage of our account is that it has greater explanatory power than existing 14 theories by providing a unifying explanation of the sensory and other non-social features of autism, as well as atypicalities (both weaknesses and strengths) in autistic perception.
The Bayesian framework also allows for concepts like top-down knowledge and contextual processing to be translated into testable theories about the strength or reliability of priors, and therefore serves as an excellent platform to assess the internal coherence and completeness of these ideas. Indeed, such methods should help to specify the precise nature of the atypicality -whether it lies either in the application of priors or in the learning and generating of new priors, or indeed in both [cf 44]. Future empirical work and computational modelling will no doubt determine its usefulness in elucidating the autistic experience of the world (see Outstanding Questions), and will hopefully lead to suggestions of how they may better cope with it.
Glossary
Adaptation: A dynamic process in which neural sensitivity is continuously recalibrated to "match" the characteristics of the current environment.
Aftereffect:
The perceptual distortions that arise following lengthy exposure or adaptation to a stimulus. Hypo-priors: A term we use to describe attenuated prior knowledge in autism, which would be represented as a broad prior probability distribution.
Likelihood: the function specifying the probability p(xjy) of observing a particular stimulus x for each possible state of the environment y.
Non-social symptoms: The range of autistic symptoms, which include restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, or activities, and sensory sensitivities, which are relatively non-social in nature and content.
Posterior: the probability distribution p(yjx) produced by probabilistic inference according to a particular probabilistic model of the environment.
Prior: the probability distribution p(y) defining the expectation about the environment being in any of its possible states, y, before any observation is available.
Box 1. The Bayesian approach to object perception
The Bayesian framework for perception originates in Helmholtz's [32] notion of perception as "unconscious inference". Helmholtz realised that many images are inherently ambiguous, so prior knowledge is necessary to disambiguate them. Recently, this concept has been formalised by models based on Bayes' formula for inverse inference:
where S is the shape of the object and I the image formed by it. Figure 2 How the prior is generated remains open to question, many believing it develops over the lifespan, and perhaps evolves over generations. However, several recent studies [41, 42, 60] suggest that even 5-10 minutes of learning can be sufficient to alter the prior. Figure 1 . Some examples that powerfully demonstrate the importance of prior knowledge in interpreting ambiguous bottom-up information. A. The Kanizsa triangle: three circles with segments missing and a triangle placed directly in front of them. The edges of the triangle are not really there, but would be for the most probable physical interpretation, a white triangle overlaying three regular circles. B. The Hollow-face illusion. A strong bias (or "prior") for natural concave faces offsets competing information (such as shadows) and causes one to perceive a concave, hollow mask (right) as a normal convex face (left). C. Shepard's table illusion. The two-dimensional images of the tabletop parallelograms are in fact identical. However, the image is consistent with many three-dimensional shapes, the most probable being real tables slanting at about 45°: to be consistent with the identical 2-D images, the tables need to be of very different dimensions.  Do individual differences in the strength of priors relate to differences in the degree of autistic symptoms (e.g., sensory sensitivities)?
Figures
 Can the idiosyncratic pattern of sensory atypicalities in an individual be accounted for by differences in exposure to particular environmental stimuli?
 Why is social information processing especially at risk in autism? Is it because social stimuli are inherently more complex and ambiguous than non-social stimuli?
 Is the way that people with autism view the world around them characterized by "Bayesian surprise" [65] ?
 How can this account be related to Bayesian models of other neuropsychiatric conditions?
For example, in schizophrenia, hallucinations are assumed to result from hyper-priors [66, 67] , which would place autistic and schizophrenic symptoms at the extremes of a continuum.
